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Abstract 
The guide in the elaboration of this article was the work of the famous attorney of the 
new institutionalism, D. North, named “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance”. 
His central idea was focused on the retaining wall of the necessity of an institutional 
change that to permit the economic performance. The author observes that the productive 
activity depends in an essential way by the institutionalization on property rights and by 
the observance of the contracts. If a system of property is institutionalized in a good 
manner and in same time he’s stable, then we can talk about by a fosterage of the 
investments on a long term, in these way facilities the productive activity. On the 
contrary, when the property is affected by risks and raised costs, the peoples will be 
attracted to the direct gaining based on speculation and on the obtaining of one fairly 
substantial part by the property existing already. 
Considering all these, our step try to astound, essentially, the reasons for that the 
structures of governance must refer at an institutional change in a state, change that must 
generate the economic performances.     
 
Nowadays, the study concerning the institutions and their impact on economic 
growth and development represent an important research theme for the 
contemporary economists. 
Why and how do institutions change? How do institutions persist in a 
changing environment and how do processes that they unleash lead to their own 
demise? At all these questions we will try to find some answers. 
Development of the game theoretic perspective on institutions thus requires 
extending it to studying institutions as a product of an historical process in which 
institutions endogenously change. Furthermore, doing so will enhance integration 
of this perspective with complementary perspectives, such as that of institutional 
path-dependence in economics [North, D., 1990, David, P., 1994, Greif, A., 1994] 
which says that the institutions from past and the institutional elements are a part 
of the medium who implies the processes that go to the creation of the new 
institutions. 
After many decades of economic deprivation and political oppression, 
socialist regimes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe withered away by 
the end of 1980 years. The end of socialism created an opportunity for people in 
these countries to develop better institutions.  Indeed, new leaders in the region 
immediately announced plans for institutional restructuring. In the early 1990s, 
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most citizens seemed willing to bear the cost of  transition, and free-market ideas 
enjoyed significant political capital. 
The transformation of the Central and Eastern Europe countries socialist 
economies into capitalist-or free-market, private-property- economies was the new 
leaders´ major stated objective in the early 1990s
1. Conceptually, genuine 
capitalism is institutionalized as prescribed by the doctrines of classical 
liberalism. Its main traits are the rule of law, constitutional democracy, and open 
markets
2. The rule of law, which the constitution embodies, guarantees stability 
and credibility of private-property rights, contractual freedom, and an independent 
judiciary. Those institutions, often seen as guarantors of so-called negative rights, 
protect individual members of the community from being forced by a majority 
rule, decision makers in government, labor unions, and other rent-seeking groups 
to subordinate the pursuits of their private ends to a desired outcome.              
James M. Buchanan observes: ,, in a rule-of-law state there is an explicit 
prejudice in favor of previously existing rights, not because this structure 
possesses some intrinsic ethical attributes, and not because change itself is 
undesirable, but for the much more elementary reason that only such prejudice 
offers incentives for the emergence of voluntary negotiated settlements among 
[individual members of the community] [Buchanan, J. 1975, p. 52]. Open markets 
reflect a network of contractual rights and posibilities based on the rule of law and 
constitutional democracy. In a world of bounded rationality, open markets provide 
freely choosing individuals with strong incentives spontaneously to develop, try 
and accept institutional arrangements (´´rules of the game,,) that minimize the 
transaction costs of voluntarily (1) letting resources find their highest-valued uses 
and (2) accepting the risk associated with the development (innovation) of new 
opportunities for exchange.  
In others words, the institutions that offer greater incentives for voluntary 
interactions are more efficient than institutions that provide fewer options for free 
exchange. 
The neoclassical type of thinking explain so-called ,,trinity of the transition 
process´´: the macroeconomic stability, the privatization and the liberalization of 
prices. 
                                                           
1 Although some leaders in Central and Eastern Europe countries believed in the 
transformation to capitalism, others misunderstood the implications (costs) of capitalism, and still 
others merely paid lip service to the transition to capitalism in order to please the West and local 
free-market parties. 
2 The rule of law means absence of arbitrary power on the part of the ruling group; subjection 
of all citizen to the same stable and credible laws, also, to the democratic elections. The absence of 
discretionary power means that no rule is to be enacted with the intent of helping or harming 
particular individuals.  
  73 
 
Institutional reorganization supposes a destabilization of the rules of 
community. The politics that over impose  the objective of the macroeconomic 
stability through institutional reorganization can be explained only by the 
neoclassical suppositions which affirm that it’s creating new equilibrium 
momentary or that it’s possible the good adjustment of the economic processes by 
the govern. 
If in the ´80 years the option by neoclassical type was for ,,the retired state,, 
and for the affirmation of the civil society, at the beginning of `90 years the 
attention was focused on the role of institutions which can  accelerated or stop the 
development. Since of the beginning of XX century, the attorneys of the old 
institutionalism T. Veblen and J.R. Commons criticized the economic theories for 
the ignorance of the role of institutions in the development [Veblen, T., 1948, 
Commons, J.R., 1961]. This ,,old institutionalism´´ it wasn’t resume than later by 
the economists , through ,,the new institutionalism´´ for analyze the emergence of 
the markets, the property rights or the state but, especially for explain the 
differences between the economic performance of the nations. 
In other way, the fundamental question is formulated something like that: how 
can be explaining these differences between the economic performances of the 
developed states and the underdeveloped states?  
Is obviously for everyone that the gap between the riches nations (developed) 
and those that are poor (underdeveloped) has the tendency to conserve themselves 
and especially to grow. Afterwards, some states hold for a long period in a 
stagnation form or economic decline while others states advanced them 
permanently on the way of the accumulation of wealth. Again, the question is: 
how can be explaining these divergent tendencies? The theoretical response at all 
these questions supposed, at the beginning of `90 years, a contest of the 
neoclassical economic theories and an invocation of the institutions
1 and 
organizations like explanatory  factors of the economic performances. The 
assumption of this approach is that the models of development, economically or 
politically, are specific of one institutional context that is the property to vary in 
function by the historical time or by the geographical space. In consequence, it 
can’t exist an universal model of the development but only institutional alternative 
models. The institutional constraints has the mission to establish the different type 
of organizations (firms, trade-unions, political parties), all of these acting in the 
directions that bringing them maximum of satisfaction [Vlǎsceanu, Lazǎr, 2001, 
p. 56].   
Accordingly, to analyze the conditions and the frame of the development 
means to consider the formal and informal rules that regulate the rapports between 
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the social actors and the organizational frames within they unfolded the activity. 
These rules aren’t only compelling but also incentive, namely not fix only the 
limits of the activities or exchanges but they are the rewards that can be obtain in 
a known frame.  
Thus, researching the history of the development of different economies, C.D. 
North affirms: ,,if the organizations […] dedicate their efforts on the unproductive 
activity then the institutional constraints offer a structure of  incentives for an 
activity like this one´´ [North, D. 1990, p. 92] . 
The countries of the third world are poor because ,,the institutional constraints 
define a set of recompenses of the political/economical activity that not 
encouraged the productive activity [North, D. 1990, p. 110]. In this direction, C.D. 
North compares the American economy of the XIX century with the economy of 
the contemporary countries in development to set off the institutional differences 
and their divergent effects. The institutional frame that appeared in USA at the 
beginning of XIX century (The Constitution,  The Northwest Ordinance and the 
norms by comportment that remunerate the supported labor) would have gone at 
the development of those political and economical organizations that was centered  
on the supported labor, productivity, saving, investment and valuing the 
education. In this context of formal and informal opportunities appeared those 
organizations that had followed to benefit by stimulants and recompenses 
available, concomitantly making more powerful the prevalent institutions and 
continuing their development [Vlǎsceanu, Lazǎr, 2001, p. 57].    
The economic growth was constantly induced by the institutional frame that 
stimulated the organizations to engage in the productive activities. If we report us 
at the countries in development we can see that here the institutional frame is a 
mixture that generate two kinds of opportunities (productive and redistributive) 
for the political and economical contractors. 
In opinion of North, the institutional frame works, in the underdeveloped 
countries, in a manner that ,,favored the activities that promote specially 
redistribution not production, that create monopoles not the conditions  of 
competitiveness and that restrict not extend the opportunities […]. The 
organisations that developed in this institutional frame will become more efficient 
– but they will be more efficient in to make the society more unproductive and the 
basic institutional structure more generator by unproductive activity. This 
direction can persist because the transaction costs of the political and economical 
markets of these economies together with the subjective models of the actors not 
conduct them to results more efficient “[North, D. 1990, p. 9]. 
The institutions are identified with ,,constraints on behaviour in the form of 
rules and regulations´´[North, 1981, p.18]. Culture is important to the extend that 
,,moral and ethical behavioural norms aimed to reduce enforcement costs   [Levi, 
M.,1988, p.47].  
The new institutionalism examined the variety of institutions but the micro- 
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economic theories it utilize – transaction cost economics, the theory of property 
rights ant public choice theory – constrained most of its historical analyses to 
institutions defined and enforced by the state 
[Alston, L., and Higgs, R., 1982, p. 28]. This historical analysis is guided by 
three deductive assertions [Davis, L. and North, D., 1971, p. 19].  First, 
institutions defined and enforced by the state – property rights, rules and 
regulations- determine economic performance through their impact on 
transactions costs. Second, the economic implications of a given institution 
change over time due to technological change, population growth, market 
integration, and other factors. Therefore, the economic outcomes depend on 
efficient institutional change. Furthermore, the specialization increases transaction 
cost (holding institutions constant) implying that institutional change is even more 
important in advanced economies[Wallis, J., and North, D., 1986, p. 126]. Third, 
the institutions are usually inefficient since they are determined through a political 
process and are influenced by the transaction cost of bargaining.  
We consider that the acknowledgement of the importance of the institutions 
which determine economies to work properly: private property, contract, free 
market. The government structures, which decide in an economy, must make 
every effort to take the necessary measures to protect a fundamental right, the one 
to private property, and to try to shape a conception typical for a democracy and 
free economy.  
In the last decades we are whitnessing a series of phenomena and processes wich 
characterize mankind evolution and indicates the fact that we are facing a period of 
profound transformations. Therefore, we argue the idea that economic and social 
transformation can be conceived only through the specific institutions of market and 
economic development. The question that raises is: which are the institutions that count in 
the transition process?  How an communist economy can be transformed in an performant 
market economy? At a first analysis we can state that the most important institutions are 
those related to the right and protection of property, economic adjustment, 
macroeconomic stabilization, social protection and the conduct of enterprises in a 
competitive environment. Yet, the simple realization of them, but without respecting the 
principles of economic development and the European frame of development, means an 
effort what could cost Romania another 50 years of attempts and failures. 
We emphasize that the differences between national economies of different states 
concerning growth and developement of the economy are given by the level of 
development and particularism of the institutions. 
The institutions model the behaviuor oriented to accomplishing of some economic 
objectives. But this becomes possible only if there is compatibility between these 
objectives and the institutional-cultural values that enable the achieving of them [Thomas, 
C., Daniel, 2005, p.56]. 
The institutional measures, the acknowledgement of the property right, the 
transformation of the state enterprises in capital companies, the privatisation of the 
public-owned assets, the right of establishing companies, the law of bankrupcy, the 
adopting of an  investment code became the foundation of the new market economy  
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[Lovell, W. David, 2002, p.32]. The modern institutions differ from all types of social 
order by their dynamism, by the extent that they undermine the traditional habits and by 
their global impact. 
The reorganization that we assist now, suggests that the actual mutations are 
equivalent to a radical change of the paradigm. The institutions from a society 
demonstrate the strongest change resistance. The transformation of the institutions would 
favorably affect the reaction of individuals and organizations. The institutions and their 
adaptability are the most that matter for explaining the different growth rates and 
economical development [North, Douglas, 1990, p.42]. 
Taking into discussion the case of Romania, after 1989 the emphases fall over the 
privatizations of the activity of the economic agents, the liberalization of using of the 
economic levers, the adopting of a series of  macroeconomic politics that favored the 
reorganization of the production according to the economic effectiveness principle.  
The reorganization by privatization has arisen numerous controversies and is the 
subject of a permanent dispute in theory. Romania has known during the past decade an 
economic decline, being positioned after 1985 in the economic decreasing area that 
profoundly accentuated after 1989. The complex process of reorganization at the micro 
level as well as the macro level requires immense social costs hard to be supported by the 
population. The expected investments were quite reduced; no flux of competitive 
technique and technology has been produced by the new owners.   The investments that 
have been made were especially focused on light industry, the food industry, trade and 
tourism, sectors in which the possibility of investment recovery is more probable. So the 
reduced investment attracted a high rate of unemployment fact with considerable 
implications in economic development of our country.   
In the acctual world economic context, Romania must not only to became a 
functional state in the competitive economic system of market economy but it must give 
priority to the economic sectors, its branches and subbranches in the direction of orienting 
of the national economy through those branches that are not consuming big amounts of 
natural resources and that offers the posibility of capital accumulation in a short time for 
this accumulation to be reinvested, so the national investment flux, capable to revitalize 
the economy to be assured and this to assure also the growth of the living standard of the 
population.      
      The  institutional  analyze  demonstrated that the rhythm and the direction of the 
development are historical dependent, and the discrepancies in the history, through 
revolutions, not eliminate totally the path dependence
1, namely by history and will 
survive and perform the most efficient institutions in the reduction of transaction costs 
(the capitalist firm for example).           
      Thus, in a functionalist vision, the institutions, like incentive alignment or governance 
structures are the result of the efforts that suppose to minimize the transaction costs. The 
institution of the modern firm capitalist is, in the opinion of Williamson, the guerdon of 
economizing on transaction costs but not to one historical process of path dependence or 
of the exploitation of the workers by the capitalists [Williamson, O., 2002, p.37]. The 
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holders of capital had become the owners of the firms who economizing transaction costs 
but not because of history [Păunescu, Mihai, 2002, p.38]. In the support of these can 
come so-named ,,state of development”, namely that state in which ,,the politic 
concentrated many power, autonomy and capacity at the central level for model, apply 
and encourage the realization of one explicit objectives of development, or through the 
establishment or the promotion of the conditions and direction of economic growth, or 
through the direct organization of these, or through a mixture of both” [Leftwich, Adrian, 
1995, p. 12]. 
       We consider that the institutional change is a necessity in a state for generates de 
economic performances only if this realizing and imposing concordantly with the just, 
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